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CASE COMMENTS

The Court has left the ultimate solutions for assuring greater quality and
uniformity of opportunity for education to legislative representatives and
their constitutents. 56 Hopefully, the states will respond to this challenge with
courage.
CHmYL RYON EisEN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRISONERS' RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO LEGAL MATERIALS
Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972)
Plaintiffs, indigent inmates in custody of the Florida Division of Corrections, instituted a civil' class action 2 against the Division's director. The complaint alleged that the state's failure to furnish a law library or professional
legal assistant to aid inmates in pursuing available post-conviction remedies
was a denial of equal protection and due process because it rendered meaningless their right of access to the court as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 3 Finding for the plaintiffs, the United
States District Court HELD, the state has a constitutional duty to funish
prison inmates with "expensive law libraries" or professional or quasi-profes4
sional legal assistance and ordered the parties to submit implementation plans.
56. 411 US. at 58. The Court further opined: "The need is apparent for reform in tax
systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax." Id.
"Still, supporters of tax reform fear that with a High Court ruling no longer hanging over
their heads many legislators will be less willing to challenge entrenched interests. 'The history of the legislature,' says Texas State Rep. Bob Vale, 'has been that it will not take action
to correct inequities unless prodded by the courts."' Nwvsw=, April 2, 1973, at 93. Nevertheless, the Supreme Courts of New Jersey, Michigan, and California have already ruled that
current school-financing practices in those states, essentially identical to the system at issue
in the instant case, violate the equal protection clauses of their state constitutions. See Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 585, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich.
1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 478, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
1. The action was initiated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970), which provides: "Every
person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state
or territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in eqdity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
2. The court held the requirements for maintaining a class action under rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been satisfied. 352 F. Supp. 163, 166 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
3. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, §1.
4. 352 F. Supp. at 169.
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While access to the courts has been firmly recognized as a constitutional
right,5 its scope has traditionally been limited by the principle enunciated in
Price v. Johnson6 that "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system." Thus, in Hatfield v. Bailleaux,7
the first case to consider the question of access to legal materials, the court
found no affirmative duty on the part of the state to ensure such access.8
Subsequent decisions9 echo the rationale offered in Hatfield that access to
legal materials was not a component of the constitutional right of access to the
courts but an activity subject to the discretion of prison administrators. 10 If
access to the courts was not directly restrained, a reasonable restriction on
access to legal materials would be upheld. 11 Access to legal materials, by itself,
12
was found to be beyond the scope of constitutional protection.
These decisions, however, are inconsistent with the philosophy expressed by
the Supreme Court on related issues.1 3 The Court has recognized that for the
right of access to the courts to be meaningfully exercised, the prisoner must be
able to present his claim with a minimum of legal competence. 14 Regardless
5. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
6. 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
7. 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
8. Id. at 640. "State authorities have no obligation under the federal Constitution to
provide library facilities and an opportunity for their use to enable an inmate to search for
legal loopholes in the judgment and sentence under which he is held or to perform services
which only a lawyer is trained to perform."
9. See Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1966); Cruz v. Hauck, 345 F. Supp. 189
(W.D. Tex. 1972); Coonts v. Wainright, 282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla. 1968), aIJ'd per curiam,
409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969); Roberts v. Peppersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967); United States ex rel. Wakely v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7
(E.D. Pa. 1965).
10. See Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1966).
11. See Roberts v. Peppersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).
12. In 1969 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which will rule
on the instant case if it is appealed, affirmed per curiam a district court opinion invalidating
a prison regulation prohibiting inmates from giving legal assistance to each other but denied
a request for an order requiring the state to provide law books to the prisoners with the
brief statement that the state was under no obligation to provide the material requested.
Coonts v. Wainwright, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969).
13. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (inmates must be allowed to give legal
assistance to each other); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel must be provided in an appeal taken of right); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fees cannot
bar indigent inmates from filing habeas corpus petitions); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
(filing fees cannot bar indigents from opportunity to seek discretionary review); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcripts must be provided for indigents); Ex parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546 (1941) (prison officials cannot "review" inmate petitions addressed to the courts).
14. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Court held a transcript was necessary
for adequate preparation of a bill of exceptions. The right to appeal his conviction was said
to be meaningless for an indigent without a transcript, since he could not present the court
with the reasons he should be granted relief. Failure of the state to provide indigents with
a free transcript was held a denial of equal protection because those who could afford a
transcript had the opportunity to pursue a meaningful appeal while those who could not
afford one could not effectively appeal their conviction.
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of the merits of his claim, if the indigent and often poorly educated prisoner
were restricted to his own resources, his petition for relief was not likely to
receive favorable treatment. 15 The affluent prisoner, however, could secure the
benefit of counsel in pursuing the same type of relief. These differences in
ability to address the courts have been viewed by the Supreme Court as a
denial of equal protection. 6 Further, in Johnson v. Avery1 7 the Court held
that inmates must be allowed to receive legal assistance from other inmates' 8
in the absence of a reasonable alternative provided by the state. 9 The Court
has also affirmed a district court order 20 enjoining enforcement of a California
prison regulation severely limiting the library facilities available to inmates.2 '
The district court had found access to legal resources to be within the scope

of the right of access to the courts, noting that "access to the courts encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought against him or grievances alleged
22

by him."
Following these same principles, the instant court reasoned that while it
would be patently unconstitutional for a state to prohibit a wealthy inmate
from securing legal assistance at his own expense, the state is also effectively
destroying the right of access to the courts for indigent inmates when it fails
to provide them with some form of legal assistance. 23 The contention that
legal aid was indispensable in framing petitions for relief was dismissed as
untenable.2 4 The disparity between the resources available to the wealthy inmate and those available to the indigent inmate was thus deemed an invidious
discrimination based on poverty.25 The defendant's only justification for the

15. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969).
16. Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353, 357-58 (1963). (Equal protection requires indigent
prisoners be provided counsel in an appeal taken of right. While the Court specifically limited
its holding to the first appeal taken of right, the reasoning applies equally to the prisoner
seeking post-conviction relief).
17. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
18. Id. at 488.
19. Ayers v. Ciccone, 303 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Mo. 1969), held that the hiring of an attorney
to render preliminary legal assistance to inmates in combination with a legal assistance program by a nearby law school constituted a reasonable alternative as contemplated by Johnson.
20. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (ND. Cal.), aff'd sub nom., Younger v. Gilmore,
404 U.S. 16 (1970).
21. The regulation would have restricted the content of the library to various California
Codes, United States Constitution and Code, one law dictionary, a manual on procedure, a
manual on the rules of court, and a state digest and would have destroyed all nonconforming
volumes.
22. Id. at 110.
23. 352 F. Supp. at 167, 168. This parallels the rationale in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969), where the Supreme Court held it would be unconstitutional for the state to
adopt a rule forbidding illiterate or poorly educated prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions.
When the state fails to provide prisoners any form of legal assistance and prohibits them
from receiving assistance from other prisoners, it is in effect denying the right to fie such

petitions.
24. 352 F. Supp. at 167.
25. Id. at 168. The court also found the inadequacy of legal services denied indigent
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status quo was the costliness of providing legal services. Since a fundamental
constitutional right was involved, the court found this justification to be unreasonable and inadequate as a matter of law.26
In the past the judiciary has largely confined itself to invalidating restrictive measures 27 such as the de jure limitation on access to legal materials
involved in Gilmore v. Lynch. 25 The instant court, however, held that the
Constitution prohibited a state from indirectly accomplishing the same result
by a de facto limitation.29 In contrast to Hatfield and other decisions holding
incarceration to be a justification for restricting access to legal materials, 30 the
present court held that a state has an affirmative duty to eradicate discrimination precisely because the prisoner and his resources are directly controlled by
the state.31
The instant court focused upon ensuring access to the courts as a meaningful right for all inmates. In adopting an implementation plan it must therefore
decide the critical question of whether adequate access to the courts can be
assured by providing inmates with a law library or whether a combination of
legal materials and professional legal assistance is necessary. The latter alternative appears preferable. The high incidence of substandard levels of intelligence and education in prison populations 32 indicates that library facilities
alone may not be beneficial, since many inmates would be unable to utilize
them competently." Furthermore, were libraries provided, the indigent prisoner would still not be on a par with his wealthy cellmate. As noted in Douglas

prisoners due process of law. Although a prisoner may have a valid claim, if he cannot
competently address the court any potential relief is but a "hollow promise."
26. 352 F. Supp. at 167.
27. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
28. 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom., Younger v. Gilmore, 404 US. 16
(1970).
29. 352 F. Supp. at 166, 168.
30. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wakely v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7, 12 (E.D. Pa.
1965).
31. 352 F. Supp. at 167.
32. Brief for Florida Volunteer Parole Aide Program as Amicus Curiae at 2-4, Hooks v.
Wainwright, 352 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972). Based on new felony convictions statistics
compiled by the Florida Division of Corrections, 46% of Florida inmates have I.Q.'s below
100 (average); 66% have not completed high school; 41% come from poverty and low-income
homes. Since earning power ceases upon incarceration the amicus estimates that 95%b of the
inmates cannot afford to hire attorneys.
33. Comment, Prisons- State Must Devise System Ensuring Indigent Prisoner's Meaningful Access to the Courts, 21 BUFFALO L. Rzv. 987, 993 (1972). "Another major stumbling
block encountered by many prisoners desiring to assault their convictions is the lack of
adequate education. The uneducated writ-writer is not capable of intelligently analyzing the
function of law in our society or of interpreting the court decisions construing the law....
They may copy quite extensively from a number of decisions and emerge from the library
clutching a handful of notes and citations which they believe will support their allegations
of denials of constitutional rights. Ask one at random: 'What are the facts of People v.
Doakes? Is there any similarity between the facts of your case and the Doakes case?' He will
look at you with a puzzled expression and reply, 'Hell, I don't know, but this is what the
court said."' Larsen, A PrisonerLooks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. Rv.343, 352 (1968).
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v. California,-4 the indigent must convince the court there is some merit in his
case before counsel is appointed while the rich inmate may retain counsel prior
to filing suit.
It has also been suggested that the courts have recognized the continuing
confrontation between the state and the individual, lasting from the moment
of arrest until completion of appeal, as the period for which appointed counsel
is granted.35 Since the state has direct and complete control over the prisoner,
however, the incarceration period should also be recognized as a confrontation,
and the right to counsel should be granted to indigent prisoners pursuing postconviction relief.36 While prison regulations may be eminently fair, their efficacy depends on the good faith of prison administrators. Since in the event
of misfeasance the prisoners' only avenue of redress lies with the courts, ensuring effective access to the courts by providing inmates with counsel may be
the best riot prevention presently available.
Additionally, providing inmates with counsel should alleviate some persistent judicial problems in post-conviction relief. Many of the pitfalls inherent in jailhouse lawyering T would be elminated, since inmates would
shift their reliance for legal assistance from other inmates to their attorneys.38
Also, the burden on the courts in attempting to decipher and rule on pro se
petitions submitted by inmates31 would be reduced, since claims could be
screened and shaped by counsel before reaching the court. Finally, provision of
legal assistance should increase prisoner morale, hopefully allowing prisoners
to concentrate on rehabilitation rather than fruitless and frustrating legal
40
battles.

34. 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963).
35. Comment, Prisoners'Rights -Access to Courts, 42 U. CoLo. L. Rnv. 275, 290 (1970).
36. Id. Incarceration is a continuation of the confrontation between the individual and
the state because: "Everything the prisoner says or does is 'judged' and recorded by the
prison officials and, in most cases, directly relates to the length of time he is incarcerated [particularly if he has been sentenced under an indeterminate sentence law] ....
Mhe prisoner is usually unable to obtain legal help to contest any unfair judgment by the
prison administration."
37. The majority in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), acknowledged these problems,
which constituted the basis of Mr. Justice White's dissent. Specifically the problems are: (1)
the advice given is often incompetent and only contributes to the "mounting flow of inadequate and misconceived petitions." Id. at 490. (2) Severe discipline problems are presented
when advice is given only for forced consideration. Also, the jailhouse lawyer may establish
his own power structure, gaining unwarranted sway over his "clients," again causing severe
discipline problems. Id. at 500. Mr. Justice White concluded it would be far more beneficial
to the illiterate and indigent prisoner for the Court to hold that the state must provide
reasonably adequate assistance to such prisoners in preparation of post-conviction papers. Id.
at 502.
38. Note, Constitutional Law: Prison "No Assistance" Regulations and the Jailhouse
Lawyer, 1968 DuKE L.J. 343, 359 n.80, citing letter from G. W. Randall, Administrator,
Oregon State Board of Control to the DuKE L.J., Oct. 19, 1967.
39. United States ex rel. Stevenson v. Mancusi, 325 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (W.DN.Y. 1971);
Krause, A Lawyer Looks at Writ-Writing,56 CALw. L. Rv. $71, 37. (1968.
40. Larsen, supra note 33, at 363.
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